FIELD STUDY 01 · COMPUTATIONAL CRIMINOLOGY · JUL 2026When uncertain data becomes police force.
A public-data study of how camera reads, hot lists, national sharing, and human verification failures combine inside networked automated license-plate-reader systems.
No private Flock access · no live vehicle queries · no UCR proxy
FAULT CHAIN / INFORMATION LOSS
MANUFACTURER34 03 DTMsource record
MANUFACTURER34 10 DTMcamera read
token losstoken loss
COLLAPSED MATCH KEY34 DTM100 synthetic identifiers → 1 key
01 / WHAT THE DATA SUPPORT
Three findings. Three different denominators.
FOOTPRINTDOCUMENTED
113,963publicly mapped cameras
Fifty-state OpenStreetMap-derived census. A lower bound—not a vendor inventory.
CAPTUREMASS SCALE
99.890%without a contemporaneous hit
California 2021–22 detections. “Non-hit” does not mean innocent or irrelevant.
FAULT LABREPRODUCED
100:1identifier compression
Transparent synthetic middle-token-loss model; not a Flock accuracy estimate.
02 / EVIDENCE CORPUS
Scale, activity, cases, and local tests.
- 4,084Atlas ALPR recordsagency / technology rows
- 2,629records naming Flock64.4% of Atlas ALPR rows
- 3.224BCalifornia detections2021–22 public records
- 3.557Mrecorded hot-list hits0.110% of detections
- 13documented incidentsevidence-graded, not prevalence
- 600synthetic OCR inferencesopen model · local CPU
03 / WORKING CONCLUSIONThe decisive error is often not the first one.
A bad read becomes dangerous when interfaces hide ambiguity, databases distribute it, policies permit broad access, and officers treat the alert as self-authenticating suspicion. Governance has to break the whole chain.
Review twelve breakpoints →05 / EXPLORE THE RECORD
From deployment to remedy.