FIELD STUDY 01 · COMPUTATIONAL CRIMINOLOGY · JUL 2026

When uncertain data becomes police force.

A public-data study of how camera reads, hot lists, national sharing, and human verification failures combine inside networked automated license-plate-reader systems.

No private Flock access · no live vehicle queries · no UCR proxy
01 / WHAT THE DATA SUPPORT

Three findings. Three different denominators.

FOOTPRINTDOCUMENTED
113,963

publicly mapped cameras

Fifty-state OpenStreetMap-derived census. A lower bound—not a vendor inventory.

CAPTUREMASS SCALE
99.890%

without a contemporaneous hit

California 2021–22 detections. “Non-hit” does not mean innocent or irrelevant.

FAULT LABREPRODUCED
100:1

identifier compression

Transparent synthetic middle-token-loss model; not a Flock accuracy estimate.

02 / EVIDENCE CORPUS

Scale, activity, cases, and local tests.

  • 4,084Atlas ALPR recordsagency / technology rows
  • 2,629records naming Flock64.4% of Atlas ALPR rows
  • 3.224BCalifornia detections2021–22 public records
  • 3.557Mrecorded hot-list hits0.110% of detections
  • 13documented incidentsevidence-graded, not prevalence
  • 600synthetic OCR inferencesopen model · local CPU
03 / WORKING CONCLUSION

The decisive error is often not the first one.

A bad read becomes dangerous when interfaces hide ambiguity, databases distribute it, policies permit broad access, and officers treat the alert as self-authenticating suspicion. Governance has to break the whole chain.

Review twelve breakpoints →
04 / MEASURED OUTPUTS

Five public datasets. One synthetic mechanism lab.

05 / EXPLORE THE RECORD

From deployment to remedy.